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On a journey through the Kingdom, I heard the word reform everywhere I went, though no one 
seemed to agree on exactly what it meant.[1] 
-Elizabeth Rubin 
 
Saudi Arabia is currently implementing a broad set of economic, political and social reforms.[2] 
The progress made in implementing them will have a significant impact on the Kingdom's fight 
against domestic terrorism. The important question is not what kind of presence Al Qaeda has 
established in Saudi Arabia, but how some segments of society can be weaned away from the 
type of thinking represented by Al Qaeda. Unless that is done, Saudi Arabia will not be able to 
achieve either social or political stability.  
 
Given the fact that significant progress cannot be made simultaneously in all the relevant areas of 
reform, the problem facing the Saudis is one of identifying those reforms (and their sequencing 
over time) that are most likely to be critical in combating the country's domestic terrorist threat. 
The sections below attempt to sketch out such a reform strategy from the perspective of a model 
developed by Jennifer Bremer and John D. Kasarda.[3] This new approach is very relevant for 
the Saudi case because their model suggests that that terrorism is likely to develop and thrive in 
certain specific environments defined in terms of the lack of progress made in broad based 
economic, social and political reforms. On this basis Bremer and Kasarda classify Saudi Arabia 
as a prime candidate for a high level of terrorist activity. 
Terrorism and the Economy 
Frustration stemming from the economy's inability to sustain growth and provide jobs for a 
growing segment of the population is widespread in Saudi Arabia. From time to time expectations 
have been raised with oil price booms, only to be dashed once prices crash. Increasingly one 
hears: 
...there's a lot of frustration and anxiety among young Saudi men. Almost half of 
them have lost hope for the future. And they are ripe for recruitment by Islamic 
extremists…Adding to the frustration are the lack of outlets for discussion and 
debate. Trade unions are barred as are all other professional 
associations…Saudi society has few political tools to counter the extremism that 
has taken root here and the results are actions like the recent bombings in 
Riyadh.[4] 
This environment is an integral component to Bremer and Kasarda's framework.[5] Their main 
conceptual construct is what they term "The New Second World". This is a group of countries that 
have reached middle-income status over the past two decades and that are now in the midst of 
the critical economic and political transitions from third world to the first. 
 
The New Second World transition has three phases. The first, or early phase, typically begins 
when a low-income country starts to industrialize rapidly, unleashing the complex 
transformations—urbanization, income growth, economic diversification—that accompany it. 
Take-off occurs if growth continues for a decade or more. In the middle phase, industrial 
production per capita approaches three times what it was when the transition started, and growth 
in low-value-added manufacturing is rapid and sustained. Incomes rise and a middle class begins 
to emerge. Bremer and Kasarda note that if this middle phase continues for 10 to 20 years, the 
country would likely reach the advanced phase, often a time of recurring economic crisis and 
political turmoil. Countries currently in this advanced group include Brazil, Poland, Russia, and 
Turkey. 
 
Saudi Arabia is in the first stage, along with countries such as Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan (Figure 
1). This group has failed to move forward to the middle stage largely because of growth-limiting 
policies and institutional rigidities. As Bremer and Kasarda note: 
History suggests that failure to make steady progress through the New Second 
World transition's early phase to the middle period is extremely dangerous. If the 
transition stalls here—as it did in post-World War I Russia, and as it has now in 
much of the Middle East—failure can lead to revolution and Al Qaeda-style 
international violence.[6]  
 
Figure 1: New Second World Transitions; Created, based on the description of transition provided 
in Bremer and Kasarada. 
 
The one thing that the nations stuck in the early phase have in common is slowness in adopting 
market-based economies and democratic political institutions and organizations. 
Measuring Economic Freedom 
The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom[7] reflects the absence 
of government constraint or coercion on the production, distribution or consumption of goods and 
services. Stripped to its essentials, economic freedom is concerned with property rights and 
choice. To measure economic freedom the Index takes ten different factors into account:  
1. Trade policy;  
2. Fiscal burden of government;  
3. Government intervention in the economy;  
4. Monetary policy;  
5. Banking and finance;  
6. Capital flows and foreign investment;  
7. Wages and prices;  
8. Property rights;  
9. Regulation, and  
10. Informal market.  
The index provides a framework for understanding how open countries are to competition, the 
degree of state intervention in the economy, whether through taxation, spending or 
overregulation, and the strength and independence of a country's judiciary to enforce rules and 
protect private property. Some countries may have freedom in all factors; others may have 
freedom in just a few. One of the most important findings of research carried out using the index 
is that economic freedom is required in all aspects of economic life. That is, countries must score 
well in all ten of the factors in order to improve their economic efficiency and consequently the 
living standards of their people.[8] 
Saudi Arabia's Progress 
Unfortunately, the Kingdom's progress in attaining economic freedom been rather slow, 
suggesting that despite the fact that a number of reforms have been enacted in recent years, their 
impact has been somewhat limited. According to the Heritage/Wall Street Journal Index, 
economic freedom by 2004 is a bit lower than in the mid 1990s (Table 1). In 1996 the Kingdom 
was classified as mostly free (index =2.95). Starting in 1999, however, Saudi Arabia's economic 
freedom index moved into a range characterized as mostly un-free, reaching its lowest point in 
2001. Since, that date, the Kingdom has improved its economic freedom slightly, but not enough 
to return to the "mostly free" category, the minimum value needed to escape Bremer and 
Kasarda's first phase. 
 
The Kingdom's low economic freedom is illustrated by particularly low scores (Table 2) in several 
of the 10 categories noted above: trade policy; government intervention; foreign investment; and 
banking and finance. In fact, the country consistently received a "free" score in only one area—
monetary policy. Wages and prices and fiscal burden were the only areas consistently receiving a 
"mostly free" score, while trade policy, government intervention, foreign investment, and banking 
and finance consistently received scores of "repressed." Clearly, these are the areas that need 
the most immediate attention. 
 
Trade policy (4.0 in 2004; stable, high level of protectionism). The Kingdom receives 
consistently low scores in this area largely because of a wide range of non-tariff barriers. The 
Kingdom also has a number of preferences for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well 
as a vast government program that favors domestic producers. Hopefully, the phasing out of 
these restrictions will also pave the way for the Kingdom's entry into the WTO. 
 
Government Intervention (4.5 in 2004; stable, very high level). The Kingdom was considered 
to have a low degree of economic freedom in this area because of the high level of government 
consumption (27 percent of GDP in 2001). A gradual shift in budget priorities towards investment 
and away from government salaries/welfare state should assist the Kingdom's movement to a 
higher degree of economic freedom without disrupting the economy or risking higher levels of 
unemployment. 
 
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment (4.0 in 2004; worse, high barriers). As noted in the 
sections above, the Kingdom is actively working to eliminate many of the restrictions in this area. 
However, a lot of work remains to be done despite a flurry of new investment legislation. Outside 
observers are also skeptical. Miles et al. note that in the Saudi case there is a wide gap between 
reform rhetoric and actual practice.[9] 
 
Banking and Finance (4.0 in 2004; stable, high level of restrictions). The domestic 
commercial banks are heavily exposed to the government and to contractors dependent on 
government payments. Another complaint is that credit institutions such as the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF) allocate credit based largely on government-set criteria rather than 
market conditions. 
 
Property Rights. The Saudi judiciary is not perceived as independent, but as influenced by other 
branches of government. In addition many businessmen complain that the enforcement of 
contracts is slow and often arbitrary. A recurring complaint is that the courts more often than not 
side with Saudi partners in disputes with foreign firms or individuals.  
 
In sum, there has been little movement toward increased economic freedom in Saudi Arabia 
during the last several years. In fact, for 1996-2004 period as a whole there was a slight 
deterioration in this indice. If the country is to escape from Bremer and Kasarda's initial stage of 
transition, it must attack corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies, improve its regulatory 
environment, and strengthen its legal system. Historically, the unfortunate fact is that despite the 
high pay-off to economic liberalization, the process in Saudi Arabia has proceeded unevenly. 
Links of Reforms to the Real Economy 
One advantage of assigning numbers to the various dimensions of economic freedom is that it 
facilitates comparisons across countries. While this information is useful in and of itself, it also 
lends itself to the identification of empirical links with the real economy. Does increased economic 
freedom facilitate higher rates of economic growth? Lower inflation? If so, are certain components 
of economic freedom more important than other components? 
 
Numerous empirical studies have tended to confirm the positive links between increased levels of 
economic freedom and economic growth and development.[10] Taking the Middle Eastern 
economies explicitly into account, several patterns are readily apparent:[11] 
 
Saving and Investment. Key macroeconomic indicators such as capital formation, foreign 
investment, and national savings are all positively affected by increased economic freedom, 
especially the freedom to exchange with foreigners. Improved legal structure and property rights 
result in higher levels of national savings. On the other hand, reduced government size and 
improvements in the legal structure and property rights reduces consumption, presumably by 
opening up profitable outlets for increased savings. 
 
International Trade. Increased freedom to exchange with foreigners increases both imports and 
exports. In addition, deregulation in credit, labor, and business assists in expanding exports. 
 
Government Expenditures and Taxes. The percentage of the budget allocated to subsidies 
tends to decline with increased economic freedom in the public sector. Interestingly increased 
size of government is associated with lower tax revenues, no doubt leading to even greater 
deficits in many cases. 
 
Financial Development. In the financial area, and after controlling for the level of development, 
market capitalization of listed companies as a share of GDP would increase with reductions in 
regulation of credit, labor and business. Financial intermediation, a key indicator of successful 
development, would also expand with deeper reforms in the area of legal structure and property 
rights. 
 
Diffusion of Technology. The spread of technology or more technologically sophisticated 
products is greatly enhanced with progress in expanding economic freedom. In most cases, the 
key element is improvements in legal structure and property rights. 
 
In sum the empirical literature confirms the positive linkages between increased economic 
freedom and a wide spectrum of economic indicators. Clearly progress in this area should assist 
in Saudi Arabia's quest to escape the terrorism-prone first phase (Figure 1) of Bremer and 
Kasarda's New Second World development. The real question however is, given the Kingdom's 
limited capacity for undertaking extensive reforms, should further attention be devoted to 
improved economic freedom, or should emphasis be shifted at this time to other areas noted by 
Bremer and Kasarda: governance, financial regulation and development, and globalization? 
Perhaps even some elements of each? 
Governance 
As noted above, improved governance is another area of reform suggested as critical for 
sustained growth and progression through Bremer and Kasarda's phases of Second World 
development. While the ranking of countries on the basis of their relative progress in attaining 
improved governance is inherently subjective, a recent World Bank study provides a set of 
rankings incorporating the full extent of our knowledge about this phenomenon.[12] 
More precisely, the World Bank data set presents a set of estimates of six dimensions of 
governance covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  
 
Voice and Accountability. This variable measures various aspects of the political process, civil 
liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which the citizens of a country 
are able to participate in the selection of governments. Also included in this variable are indicators 
measuring the independence of the media. 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence. This governance cluster combines several 
indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown. 
 
Government Effectiveness. This variable combines aspects of the quality of public service 
provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of 
the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
policies.  
 
Regulatory Quality. This aspect of governance is more focused on the policies themselves. It 
includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development. 
 
Rule of Law. Included in this dimension of governance are several indicators, which measure the 
extent to which the citizens of a country have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. 
These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.  
 
Control of Corruption. This dimension of governance measures perceptions of corruption. By 
this measure corruption is defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. It is often a 
manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter and the corrupted for the rules that govern 
their interactions, and hence represents a failure of governance. 
 
Assigning these measures of governance to the countries in different phases of New Second 
World development produces some interesting patterns (Table 3): 
1. Each measure of governance attainment improves significantly as countries progress 
from phase 1 to phase 3. This result is consistent with the Bremer and Kasarda thesis 
concerning the relative progress in reforms as countries reach higher phases of Second 
World development.  
2. For the phase 1 countries, there was a slight deterioration between 1996 and 2002 in 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality and Rule of Law.  
3. Over the same time interval, these same countries experienced a very slight 
improvement in their ability to control corruption.  
In Saudi Arabia's case: 
1. The Kingdom consistently scores the lowest in the area of Voice and Accountability. The 
country's scores for this dimension of governance were considerably below the norm for 
even phase 1 countries. Even worse, there was a significant deterioration in voice and 
accountability over the 1996-2002 period.  
2. The country experienced a marked improvement in political stability between 1996 and 
2002. In this area the Kingdom scores considerably above the norm for phase 1 
countries.  
3. Government effectiveness and Regulatory Quality are both considerably above the norm 
for phase 1 countries. Each dimensions of governance have experienced some 
improvement over the 1996-2002 interval.  
4. In recent years the Kingdom's progress in the areas of Rule of Law and Corruption have 
also shown considerable gains. Progress in these areas has been significant to the 
extent that the Kingdom's scores in these two areas are comparable to those found in the 
phase one group of countries.  
Access to Capital 
Because of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and the Argentine financial crisis of 2000, 
Bremer and Kasarda attach great significance to capital market development as a key to 
sustained growth and development. While the Heritage/Wall Street Journal index is suggestive of 
relative progress in this area, the level of detail required by Bremer and Kasarda's model requires 
the Milken Institute Capital Access Index (CAI). This index gauges the ability of entrepreneurs to 
gain access to financial capital. That is, it provides a relative score of the ability of innovators, 
managers and owners in need of capital to start a new enterprise, expand a promising line of 
business, finance ownership change, or restructure a large multi-industry firm. The CAI measures 
not only the breadth, depth and vitality of capital markets, but also the ability to gain access 
without discrimination. By this index Saudi Arabia ranks fairly low: 80th of 89 countries in 2003. In 
2003, the kingdom was the lowest rated of the Middle Eastern countries included in this annual 
ranking of countries.[13] 
 
An insight into the factors responsible for Saudi Arabia's low capital access ranking can be 
gained from examining the factors that comprise the index. The index is made up of five key 
aspects of the country's financial markets: (1) the general economic environment; (2) bank 
lending, (3) capital market development, (4) international environment and the country's 
sovereign ratings.  
 
The General Economic Environment 
The general economic environment creates the conditions for entrepreneurial activity. Here the 
macroeconomic measures used in the CAI reflect variables relating to inflation, interest rates and 
fiscal policy. Institutional measures reflect the fact that capital access is constrained when legal 
contracts are not enforced or private and/or government agents can expropriate assets or 
earnings with no recourse. Given the basic condition of a sound macroeconomic and institutional 
setting, the next important aspect of capital access is the ease of securing bank lending.  
In creating a measure of the general economic environment, the CAI poses a number of 
questions to respondents. In what countries are banks free to lend to projects of their choice that 
are likely to yield high returns? What countries have competitive banking markets? Where are 
banks dominated by repressive policies or outright state ownership? Is the banking sector stunted 
or robust? Here, Saudi Arabia scores below the Middle East norm, itself already low by 
international standards, on the macroeconomic environment, institutional environment, banking 
depth, while scoring above the norm on banking governance and banking repression .  
 
Capital Market Development  
The next component of the CAI is capital market development. Equity and debt are vital sources 
of startup and later stage external finance, and can facilitate the restructuring of entire industries. 
Securitization and other more sophisticated instruments of finance are included in the measure of 
advanced capital market development. Here, the Kingdom again scored below the mean on 
equity and advanced aspects of capital markets. The bond market in the Kingdom, along with 
most other Middle East countries, did not get a rating on the Milken index, presumably because 
their capital markets have not reached the level of sophistication needed for meaningful 
comparisons. 
 
The International Environment  
The international environment gauges entrepreneurs' ability to access international capital, an 
additional source of funds for entrepreneurs and active capital market participants. Poor 
sovereign credit ratings are a significant barrier to capital access. While these rankings are based 
in large part on measures already included, the Milken Institute considers them on the premise 
that the various rating agencies bring additional expertise and knowledge of these markets in 
assessing country ratings. They use sovereign credit ratings by Moody's and Standard and 
Poor's. Here Saudi Arabia scored above the mean on its sovereign debt rating and international 
portfolio flows. It was below the mean on general international capital and foreign direct 
investment.  
 
With regard to the Second World grouping patterns (Tables 4, 5), there is a sharp break between 
phase 1 and phase 2 countries, but not such a sharp break between phase 1 and phase 2 
countries, suggesting that major strides in capital access may come in the latter stages of phase 
2 and the first part of phase 3.  
Globalization 
Finally, Bremer and Kasarda's model assumes increased integration (globalization) into the world 
economy as a condition for successful progress through the phases of Second World 
development. Unfortunately, there are no direct measures of globalization.[14] It is a 
multidimensional phenomenon that defies precise measurement. However, the A.T. Kearney 
company has compiled a comprehensive data set including most of the facets commonly 
associated with the term.[15] 
 
Kearney's sixty-two sample countries are ranked on their attainment of each aspect of 
globalization Saudi Arabia ranks 54 in Economic Integration, 48 in personal contacts, 50 in 
Technology, 35 in trade, 61 in FDI and 38 in portfolio flows.[16] 
New Second World Dynamics [17] 
All the areas of reform noted above: economic freedom, governance, capital access and 
globalization define the three phases of New Second World development. The major question at 
this point is whether or not Bremer and Kasarda's model is operational. That is, given the 
available data described above and the values for specific countries could we place, with a high 
degree of certainty, a country in a unique phase and specify the conditions (progress in reforms) 
required to advance to the next phase? Steps along these lines would enable us to: (1) identify 
those reforms critical for successful transition out of the first, terrorism prone phase, and (2) the 
proper time to implement key reforms. Should significant progress be made in governance before 
tackling globalization? If so, what areas of governance are critical? And is progress in certain 
areas of globalization much more productive than others in speeding up the transition to higher 
phases?  
 
Since many of the reforms in discussed above reflect the same phenomenon, for example freer 
markets, a factor analysis was first undertaken to determine the dominant dimensions of reform—
variables that are highly associated with each other thus forming an independent reform 
dimension.[18] Out of our data set only four independent reform dimensions were found to be 
present: 
  
Dimension 1: Governance 
1. CA - Environmental/Institutional  
2. EF - Informal Market  
3. GOV - Corruption  
4. GOV - Government Effectiveness  
5. EF - Average Level of Economic Freedom  
6. GOV - Rule of Law  
7. GOV - Regulatory Quality  
Dimension 2: Capital Access 
1. CA - Capital Markets, Equity  
2. CA - Bank Depth  
3. CA - Overall Average Score (2002)- Capital Access  
4. CA - Average Value of Capital Access Scores for Financial Markets  
Dimension 3 Mixed Reforms 
1. CA - International, FDI Flows  
2. EF - Banking and Finance  
3. GOV - Political Stability  
4. GLB - Economic Globalization  
Dimension 4 Globalization  
1. EF - Trade Policy  
2. GOV - Voice/Accountability  
3. GLB - Portfolio Flows  
4. GLB - Technology  
Where: CA = Capital Access reform category, EF = Economic Freedom reform category, GOV = 
Governance reform category, and GLB = Globalization reform category 
 
A second step in the analysis, sought to determine if these dimensions could replicate the 
classification of countries provided by Bremer and Kasarda.[19] If the three phases of Second 
World development can not be defined precisely in terms of one or more of the four main reform 
dimensions noted above, then Bremer and Kasarda's framework would have little operational 
value in identifying those reforms most productive in advancing a country to a higher phase of 
Second World development.  
 
The analysis suggests that of the four reform dimensions two, globalization, followed by capital 
access, are sufficient to clearly define a unique set of reform conditions in each of the three 
phases of second world development. Based on their relative level of progress in these two 
reform dimensions 92.9 percent of the countries were classified along the lines suggested by 
Bremer and Kasarda (Table 6) The only two countries classified differently than in the Bremer 
and Kasarda framework were Venezuela, classified as a phase one country and Thailand, 
classified as a phase two country. Clearly recent developments (Asia Crisis—Thailand, 
Stagnation, Venezuela) suggest that the revised classification of is more in line with reality than 
that assumed by Bremer and Kasarda. Saudi Arabia is firmly placed in phase one with a 
probability of 86 percent (Table 6), thus corresponding to Bremer's and Kasarada's evaluation of 
the existing state of reforms in the Kingdom. 
 
To sum up, since Bremer and Kasarda's three phase framework can be replicated using a set of 
reforms for as the basis of country placement, the model can form the basis of identifying those 
areas of action are most productive in advancing countries to higher levels of development.  
Assessment 
The value of this analytical work is that it helps bring the challenges facing Saudi Arabia into 
clearer focus and enables one to prioritize reforms into an optimal sequence for action. In 
particular the this analysis of New Second World countries suggests that in the short run, Saudi 
Arabia needs to giver particular attention to trade issues and speeding up the globalization 
process. This dimension of reform was the most important in the country-grouping scheme. 
Joining the WTO is a good start as is further integration into the GCC regional group. 
 
As noted, the four key elements of the globalization dimension are: (a) trade policy from the 
economic freedom dataset, (b) voice accountability in the area of governance, (c) portfolio flows 
and (d) technology aspects of globalization. While one characteristic of group one countries are a 
low level of voice and accountability, the Kingdom scores very low even by this group's 
standards. Clearly immediate action is needed in this area, especially in transparency of 
government operations, the accountability of public official interests and various aspects of 
government censorship.  
 
In the medium term, the Kingdom will have to focus on improving the various components of 
capital access, especially deepening the banking system, and improved equity markets. While 
improved governance is always important, the analysis suggests that a higher priority needs to be 
given to capital access if the country is to progress through the Second World phases of 
development.  
 
In sum, this strategy would appear to be the most productive in lifting the Kingdom out of its 
current terrorism prone phase one stage of Second World development. A second advantage of 
the reform strategy noted above is that it would most likely not have adverse side effects on the 
country's longer-term economic growth. In this sense there appear to be no apparent trade-offs 
between the reforms suggested here, growth, and the creation of an environment less supportive 
of terrorist causes and activities. 
 
A final word of caution. The arguments above acknowledge that economic factors are not the sole 
contributor to Saudi Arabia's indigenous terrorist groups. Clearly, other factors, many specific to 
Saudi Arabia are no doubt important contributors. For that reason, a reform-led strategy to move 
into the higher phases of Second World development may be a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition, for significantly weakening the attraction posed by terrorism. Many of the real 
motivating grievances of terrorists in Saudi Arabia no doubt stem from local factors such as the 
influence of Wahhabism. Unfortunately there is little agreement on how to combat this source of 
discontent.  
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
References 
1. Elizabeth Rubin, "The Opening of the Wahhabist Mind" New York Times Magazine, 7 March 
2004: 38. 
2. Cf. Robert Looney, "Can Saudi Arabia Reform its Economy in time to Head off Disaster," 
Strategic Insights 3, no. 1 (January 2004); Robert Looney, "Saudization and Sound Economic 
Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?" Strategic Insights 3, no. 2 (February 2004); and Robert 
Looney, "Development Strategies for Saudi Arabia: Escaping the Rentier State Syndrome," 
Strategic Insights 3, no. 3 (March 2004).  
3. Jennifer Bremer and John D. Kasarda, "The Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy," The Milken Institute Review (Fourth Quarter 2002): 34-49. 
4. "Analysts Warn of Needed Reforms in Saudi Arabia to Stem Extremist Movements," NPR 
Morning Edition (26 May 2003). 
5. Bremer and Kasarda, "The Origins of Terror": 34-48. 
6. Ibid., 36. 
7. See for example Marc Miles, Edwin Feulner and Mary Anastasia O'Grady and Ana Eiras, 2004 
Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2004); 
8.Ana Isabel Eiras, Ethics, Corruption and Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 9 December 
2003). 
9. Miles, Feulner and O'Grady and Eiras, 2004 Index. 
10. See for example: J.D. Gwartney, W.E. Block and R.A Lawson, Economic Freedom of the 
World: 1975-1995 (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2002); S.T. Easton and M.A. Walker, "Income, 
Growth, and Economic Freedom," American Economic Review 87 (May 1997): 328-32; Julio 
Cole, "The Contribution of Economic Freedom to World Economic Growth, 1890-99," Cato 
Journal (Fall 2003): 189-198; and Manuel Vega-Cordillo and Jose L. Alvarez-Arce, "Economic 
Growth and Freedom: A Causality Study," Cato Journal (Fall 2003): 199-200. 
11. Robert Looney, "The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraq's Economic Transition," Middle 
East Journal 57, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 578-582. 
12. Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2002 (Washington: World Bank, 30 June 2003). 
13. Global Capital Access Index 2003 (Santa Monica: Milken Institute, April 2003). 
14. Robert Looney, "Oil Price Movements and Globalization: Is there a Connection?" OPEC 
Review 26, no. 3 (September 2002): 235-259. 
15. "Measuring Globalization: Who's Up, Who's Down," Foreign Policy (January/February 2003): 
60-72. 
16. Ibid., 65. 
17. A full set of the statistical work described in this section is available from the author upon 
request. 
18. For a description of this technique Cf. SPSS Base 10.0 Applications Guide (Chicago: SPSS 
Inc, 1999): Ch 16. 
19. The statistical technique used was discriminant analysis. Cf. SPSS Base 10 Applications 
Guide (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1999): Ch. 14. 
 
